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1 “We are all to be held accountable for this failure, all of us, the great powers , African
countries, the NGOS, the international community. It is a genocide. . . . I have failed. . . . It is
a scandal.”1
—UN Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Ghali
Genocide and the Threat to Global Governance
The December 1999 UN report on the Rwandan genocide, commissioned by UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan, echoes and amplifies Boutros Boutros–Ghali’s condemnation. Implicated are his office, the United
Nations—notably the permanent members of the Security Council—and the international community as a
whole for their failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide.2 The report prompts this proposal, sketched below, to
enlist the great powers and, specifically, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to
eradicate genocide as a political practice. Through concerted action genocide can conceivably be eventually
eliminated, in much the same way that the great powers, with Britain in the lead, ended the slave trade in the
nineteenth century and then slavery itself over a century of persistent effort.
Genocide threatens not only the human rights of tens of millions of peoples but also international security.
That connection was recognized over a half century ago by the United Nations in passing the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.3 These links between human rights and security are no
less fused today. The Rwandan genocide, not to mention genocidal episodes in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor
more recently,4 raise profound issues for global governance, let alone the welfare, of what is now a world
society of states and peoples for the first time in human history. What is at stake is not just the saving of
millions of lives and the homelands of the unfortunate peoples caught in the maw of these cleansing operations.
Also at risk, and of paramount political importance, is the preservation and enlargement of a stable global order,
threatened by the failure of the big powers to meet their responsibilities under the UN Charter. The Rwandan
case reveals deep splits among the great powers over humanitarian intervention. It raises disquieting questions
about the prevailing norms and rules—those actually legitimated, practiced, and enforced—by which a
decentralized international system of nation-states and an emerging international civil society of diverse and
divided peoples will be governed in the new millennium.
These issues of order and legitimacy are hardly new. They were essentially those posed at the Congress of
Vienna almost two centuries ago when the rules for the governance of the then emerging world society were
initially delineated.5 They are no closer to being resolved today than they were then, less so in many ways by
the very universalization of the nation-state as the principal unit of governance for the world’s populations.6
This decentralized and incipiently anarchic system overlays a process of increasing interdependence of the
world’s peoples, ensnared in progressively enlarging, deepening, ever thickening real-time exchanges. These
increase the number and frequency of potential conflicts among communally or ideologically divided peoples
within and across state boundaries. In these conflicts the coercive power of states is both the stake and arbitrator
of these differences.7
                                                                        
1 UN Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Ghali, quoted by Prunier (1995), p. 277, from Le Monde, May 27, 1994, speaking about the
genocide in Rwanda. (Italics added.)
2 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1944 Genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999,
http://ww.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.him.
3 Kuper (1981), pp. 19–39, summarizes the UN debates over the convention.
4 See Gurr (1993; 1994) for a list of ethnic rivalries, placing minorities at risk around the globe. For extensive references to the literature
on ethnic conflict within the context of an unconventional argument favoring separation and displacement of populations, consult Kaufman
(1996). Insightful commentaries on ethnic conflicts and how they might be terminated are found, inter alia, in these edited works: Brown
(1996; 1993); Zartman (1995). These studies converge on the proposition that ethnic strife is one of the principal threats not only to
international security but also to the sustainability and replication of the currently Westcentric coalition of liberal democratic, market states
and their civil societies. As Charles Maynes observes, “Indeed, animosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the spread of nuclear
weapons as the most serious threat to peace that the world faces.” Maynes (1993), p. 5. See also Gelb (1995).
5 Schroeder (1994). Also Johnson (1991); Kissinger (1957).
6 For many cooperation theorists, small numbers are crucial for sustained cooperation. Cooperation is viewed as the inverse proportion of
the number of interacting actors under conditions of preference diversity and division. See Baldwin (1993); Oye (1986), passim.
7 Inter alia, see Krasner (1995); Little (1993); Trachtenberg (1993) for overviews of state intervention in the domestic affairs of other
states. For the nineteenth century, inter alia, see Schroeder (1994) and Taylor (1954). For commentary that is still useful and insightful,
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The Rwandan tragedy, set within a larger, imploding central Africa, testifies to the continuing force of
genocidal politics;8 civil and interstate wars in the region now merge and borders scarcely signify state authority
and power. Domestic rivals are induced to control or influence neighboring states if they are to prevail in their
local struggles. The effects of genocide are not easily contained within the borders of a single state. Like the
ripples generated by a peddle cast into a pond, the genocide of Rwanda and succeeding genocidal episodes
extending across central Africa impact on an increasingly globalized world society and its intertwined politics.
The failure of the international community and its responsible agents—principally the great powers—to
deter, staunch, and eliminate genocide and incipient genocidal practices has two adverse effects: it encourages
rivals and states to resort to genocide as a final solution for their conflicts, and it reinforces genocide and
genocidal practices as a working rule of global governance, however universal the moral condemnation of
genocide or however much such practices violate international law. Genocidal solutions to local and regional
struggles become, ipso facto, political and strategic rules of thumb for would-be perpetrators. This practice
becomes further entrenched in the politics of global governance and persists as a credible, if execrable, option in
resolving political differences among the world’s divided peoples.
An anti-genocide regime would establish a normative and institutional foundation on which the ongoing
process of global governance could proceed. As the extreme case of crimes against humanity, genocide tests
whether the big powers can limit and eventually eliminate this practice as inconsistent with international civil
conduct and the rule of law. Until now, they have failed to reach consensus on the criteria to define genocide,
on the threat it poses to international security, or how it should be addressed by pooling the international
community’s resources and will. If the big powers fail this test, one should not expect them to make much
progress in executing their responsibilities under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter in combating and
punishing crimes against humanity that, however odious, fall short of genocide. By focusing on preventable and
containable cases, like Rwanda, the United Nations and the big powers can begin anew to repair the damage to
international norms and to big power cohesion wrought by their willful inaction to stop genocide not only in
Rwanda but elsewhere throughout the globe during the postwar era.9
Rwanda, the touchstone for this analysis, is viewed below as a thread in a larger pattern of genocidal
behavior within a yet more complex tapestry of global politics. Incentives to resort to genocide are to be found
not out but inside world politics. From this perspective, the Rwandan genocide is not an aberrant form of
behavior, however repulsive and nauseating its properties. Nor is it simply the product of atavistic forces, as
Schumpeter suggests and as many believe today.10 More troubling, the Rwandan case illustrates that genocide
and episodes of genocide represent the extreme, logical conclusion of the calculations of rivals seeking a final
solution to their conflicts with opponents. The trick is to extract these damaged genocidal threads from the
tapestry of world politics without unraveling the fabric itself or undoing big power cohesion, the warp and woof
keeping the cloth whole. Modernization and globalization in all of their dimensions will continue to weave
states and people together in ever more interdependent and mutually contingent ways. Whether this process will
progress more by consensus over coercion will depend on great power cooperation. Eliminating this particularly
noxious form of political behavior will determine in some appreciable measure whether the great powers, with
the means up to the job, will direct the evolution of the world society in ways less threatening to all peoples. In
turn, the creation of an anti-genocide regime is a critical test of big power cooperation, a precondition for the
evolution of a peaceful world society.
The remaining discussion is divided into three sections. The first summarizes the prevailing, if
circumscribed, moral and legal consensus against genocide. It also outlines three lines of argument to broaden
the foundation of this consensus. Other human rights, including protection against other crimes against
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
although biased in favor of interstate order, state sovereignty, and nonintervention over humanitarian rights, see Bull (1984b), especially
Bull’s summary of the views of contributors, pp. 181–95, and Stanley Hoffmann’s projection that the prospects for continued intervention,
however defined, were bright, pp. 7–44. Hoffmann’s prescience derives from his grasp of the internal contradictions of a self-help system of
sovereign nation-states and the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of states. Under conditions of increasing interdependence,
states can hardly be indifferent to the outcomes of the domestic politics of other states.
8 This point is succinctly made by Ogenda Otunnu (1999).
9 Kuper (1981; 1985) reviews these many failures to cope with genocide. This analysis stresses the political incentives driving rivals to
resort to violence and the corresponding need to develop international institutions to blunt and thwart these incentives.
10 Schumpeter (1955). See also Kuper (1981). Chapter 2 reviews a range of theories of genocide.
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humanity, might well qualify, now or in the future, to the privileged standing accorded an anti-genocide right,11
but these claims fall beyond the scope of the present discussion.12 Eliciting consent and material support from
the international community—principally the big powers—to end genocide is sufficiently daunting, as recent
experience makes abundantly clear, to focus on this primordial threat to human rights and international security.
Given the progress made over this century in marshaling moral and legal supports for its eradication, it would
appear to be a feasible, if still long-term, aim. 13
The second section briefly dissects the Rwanda genocide to identify the principal structural political and
strategic factors explaining the failure of the United Nations and the great powers to address either the Rwandan
crisis or genocide, more widely, since the formation of the United Nations. The Rwandan calamity exposes the
principal constraints impeding the peoples and states of the world society to end genocide. These constraints
comprise the obstacles that must be surmounted if progress is to be made in privileging consent over coercion in
managing or resolving the conflicts of peoples and states.
In response to this diagnosis of why moral and legal prohibitions against genocide do not match with
political and strategic incentives for the continued practice of genocide, a final section proposes practical steps
to bridge this gap. Just as slavery took centuries to eliminate, so the eradication of genocide involves a long-
term political process and distant goal. Achieving this aim, if possible at all, will not come about sometime
soon, or all at once. Eliminating the threat of genocide in a world of peoples divided against themselves would
necessitate nothing short of a fundamental transformation of the nation-state system and a profound
reformulation of widely held but narrowly conceived notions of national interest. The paradox of the diversity
and pluralism of the world’s peoples, as Leo Kuper points out,14 is that it is the necessary context within which
genocide and genocidal episodes arise. It is also the constraint under which it have to be eliminated, if at all.
This dual condition also precludes its easy eradication. Reliance on the expectation of political, socioeconomic,
and cultural convergence of the world’s populations, or what some conceive as the end of history, appear
utopian.15 Realization of that vision is not likely to occur in the near future, nor is that prospect viewed as
desirable by the vast majority of the world’s enlarging and differentiated populations.16
Broadening and Deepening the Anti-Genocide Regime:
Moral and Legal Dimensions
This proposal to end genocide is modest, when measured against the enormity of the Rwandan atrocities and,
even more so, when viewed against the backdrop of the long, conflict-ridden biosocial evolution of the human
                                                                        
11 The literature on humanitarian intervention or, more broadly, intervention of all kinds, including coercive means, to protect and extend
human rights, other international norms to the contrary notwithstanding, is vast, sprawling and contentious. For relevant commentary which
presents radically contrasting points of view, and for an introduction to this rapidly expanding literature, see these authored or edited works:
Bull (1984b); Damrosch (1993); Forbes (1993); Harriss (1995); Lyons (1995); McDermott (1997); Ramsbotham (1995); Reed (1993);
Vincent (1974). Donnelly (1993b); Jackson (1993a) explore the complexities of armed intervention. Donnelly is particularly skeptical about
its likely benefits, however well motivated such operations may be. For a brief but well researched and informed bibliographical overview of
armed intervention and its relation to just war theory, see Fixdal (1998).
12 David Luban, following Henry Shue, develops the distinction between basic and nonbasic rights. This discussion narrows the scope of
the former even further and for purposes of analysis and effective policy impact resists enlargement of basic rights to “subsistence rights,
which include the rights to healthy air and water, and adequate food, clothing, and shelter.” Luban (1985), p. 210. The focus here is even
narrower in excluding political civil liberties from the discussion. Excluding these claims from this discussion in no way implies that they do
not possess moral or legal force, nor warrant material protection. For a helpful listing of these larger set of human rights, political and
socioeconomic, see Donnelly (1993a).
13 This line of argument departs from the view of many who would restrict the United Nations solely to the role of norm creator and
evaluator, leaving politics and power to others. That shrinking of its responsibility for international security would be tantamount to an
fundamental and decisive revision of the Charter. The original intention of the UN founders was precisely to elicit big power support for
peace and global order since they would have the Austinian power to back them up. For a carefully argued articulation of the norm-restrictive
position at odds with the analysis here, see Barnett (1995), especially p. 49. Barnett cites Thomas Franck and Inis Claude in defense of his
position, but it is not clear that either would advocate so severe a narrowing of the Charter as well as a diminution of the duty of the great
powers to ensure peace among themselves and the world as well. Consult Claude (1966); Franck (1988); Franck (1990); Franck (1973).
14 Kuper (1981; 1985) argues persuasively that plural societies are the breeding ground for genocide. This analysis builds on this
theoretical insight and applies Kuper’s insights to the world society.
15 Fukuyama (1992). Fukuyama believes that democratic rule and consumerism will glue the world’s populations together.
16 Robertson (1992) develops this insight.
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species.17 Since it focuses not only on the justification for great power intervention to end genocide but also on
surmounting the contending choices and strategies impeding the end of this practice, recommendations for
reform are informed by these limits.18 The proposal seeks to strengthen the international norms and to marshal
and institutionalize the requisite material capabilities and political will to widen the scope, accelerate the rate,
and enhance the effectiveness of current efforts to end genocide through big power cooperation under the UN
Charter.
The moral and legal basis for an anti-genocide regime is firmly, if narrowly, laid in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.19 Four groups are privileged under the Convention.
Proscribed are “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic.], racial or
religious group”20 The Convention defines genocide as: “(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; [and] (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”21
Violations of the Convention are to be enforced under Article VI by domestic courts or “by such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction.”22 To demonstrate that genocide is being perpetrated, the prosecution must show that
those engaged in mass murder consciously plotted and intended to eliminate, in whole or in part, the members
of a targeted group. Stress is placed on punishing individuals and government officials in the aftermath of the
commission of their crimes. While the Contracting Parties are empowered to “call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations . . . for the prevention and
suppression of acts of genocide,” the Convention provides no institutional means or mechanisms to prevent
genocide. Such measures are principally left to the organs of the United Nations and, specifically, to the
Security Council. Pertinent are Chapters VI, which covers “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” and VII, which
extends to “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.”
Significant under Chapter VII is the authorization of the Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Relevant, too, is the
Security Council’s capacity to call on the member states to provide forces to implement actions in pursuit of
international security. In short, there is sufficient authority—moral and legal—under the Genocide Convention,
under associated human rights resolutions, and under the UN Charter to address the crime of genocide covering
                                                                        
17 For sweeping historical presentations, see Diamond (1992; 1997); McNeill (1963; 1992). For the depredations of twentieth century
states, see Kuper (1981; 1985); Rummel (1994).
18 This proposal runs into two offsetting criticisms: the first and more prominent is that it is to timid. See the following for a more
expansive argument favoring humanitarian interventions, including military force, to promote human rights over a much larger range than
embraced by this analysis: Compare to Levy (1993); Reisman (1990); Rieff (1995); Rosas (1994); Smith (1994); Weiss (1995). Conversely,
those adhering to a strict non-intervention principle would view this proposal as too extreme. See Akehurst (1984); Fonteyne (1974); Mason
(1996); and Thomas (1993). Mason provides a realist case against armed intervention. I assume more a conditional version of the position
which Howard Adelman characterizes as an international realist in which “humanitarian intervention . . . should and ought to become the
dominant international norm of the international community in dealing with gross violations of human rights.” Adelman (1992a; 1992b) p.
68.
19 United Nations (1995), pp. 151–53.
20 Ibid., p. 151. (Italics added.)
21 United Nations (1995), p. 151. Note that Dextexhe (1994–95) in his review of the Rwandan case adopts a restrictive notion of genocide
and, consequently, insists on its infrequent occurrence. This discussion argues for a more expansive notion that not only lodges genocide in
the intent of perpetrators who may be frustrated in their most ambitious designs but views genocide, as the Genocide Convention notes, as
associated with the physical destruction of groups in whole or in part. (Italics added.) This latter phrase opens genocide to a wider number of
cases than Dextexhe’s view allows. Note also that genocide is depicted here as a political practice and strategy; as such, it is embedded in the
logic and incentives of implacable adversaries appealing to violence to prevail. This is what this discussion means by a Hobbesian end game.
It approximates what Clausewitz means by pure or ideal war between individuals, groups or states as an infinite duel driven by the aim of
each seeking to destroy or prevail over rivals. Clausewitz (1976). In the case of genocide, pure and real war merge; hence genocide is an
extreme or limiting case. The politics of genocide which will define its ultimate meaning logically extends to mass murders under the guise
of genocidal episodes, like the extermination of thousands of Muslims in 1995 by Serbs at Srebernica. See Institute (1999), intervention by
Michael McClintock, pp. 70–80, which extends the phenomenon of genocide to episodes and repressive acts as precursors of genocide, such
as the creation of concentration camps. The latter, for example, are presently being created by the Tutsi-dominated governing in Burundi as a
response to the Hutu insurgency. New York Times, December 27, 1999.
22 United Nations (1995), p. 151.
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the four groups identified for protection. Absent, however, are sufficient international will and mobilized and
institutionalized resources to preclude its occurrence and to enforce an anti-genocide code of conduct.
As a peremptory legal right under international law, freedom from genocide permits “ no derogation” from
its strictures; hence any treaty that might conflict with this norm is “ void.” 23 As a peremptory norm, the
prohibition against genocide can be said to be putatively acknowledged, universally, as a crime against
humanity and against the society of states into which humanity is severally composed as political and moral
entities. The practice of genocide undermines, as Rwanda’s post-colonial history exemplifies, the values and
norms on which the society of states and the independence and sovereignty of its members depend for their
legitimacy. In signing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, states
“confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law.”24 Noteworthy is the prohibition against genocide in war during which, presumably, contesting groups,
including the state itself, is seeking to impose its will on opponents by force. As a rule of the law of war,
genocide is forbidden under the Convention as a belligerent practice.25 Eliminating genocide as a strategic
option to overcome opponents or, more generally, as a political practice does not mean that coercion or force or
large-scale civil war is outlawed, too. Nor that the lives of combatants and the innocent will be spared, whether
they are engaged in a just war or not. Rivals are not otherwise constrained by the Convention against genocide,
save the circumscribed but crucial limit that they cannot intend to eliminate each other simply because of
membership in a particular group. There is little need to create a new, universal prohibition against genocide
covering peace and war at least for the four protected groups under the Convention. This constraint already
exists and enjoys the consent, if not always the practiced adherence, of member states party to the genocide
Convention and to the UN Charter.
However, additional moral and legal force can be added to an anti-genocide regime if it is reconceptualized
and revised to bring it into conformity with the profound changes that have occurred in world politics since
World War II. This can be done in three ways: (1) by establishing the notion of species solidarity and a
universal humanity as the authoritative basis for global rule, transcending the provisional claims of the nation-
state; (2) by expanding the prevailing meaning of sovereignty to entail an obligation on the part of states not
only to respect the right of groups and their members to be free from genocidal attacks but also to assume a duty
to eliminate these practices; and (3) by enlarging the protection of the Genocide Convention to cover political,
social, and economic groupings, presently excluded from the Convention.
Genocide as an Absolute and Universal Right
The immediate postwar world was essentially a world of states and disintegrating European empires. The
United Nations Charter reflected this distribution of state power and authority. Essentially formed as a state-
centric organization, the United Nations was erected on the shaky foundation of the sovereign equality of all its
members under Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter. It also affirmed the principle of non-interference in the
domestic affairs of sovereign states. Member states were enjoined under Article 2 (4) from threatening or using
force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”26 If the Genocide Convention and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the General Assembly, recognized the rights and
freedoms of individuals against the state, the effective protection of these rights was left to the member states.
                                                                        
23 Cited in Ramsbotham (1995), p. 25. In drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the international commission charged
with drafting articles covering such basic rights specifically cited the criminal act of genocide. Ibid.
24 United Nations (1995), p. 151. (Italics added.) By 1990, 96 states or half of the UN membership had signed the Convention that, unlike
the Declaration of Human Rights, is a treaty whose provisions are binding on the signatories. Ramsbotham (1995), p. 22.
25 This view that law continues to operate in armed hostilities between opponents is drawn from Quincy Wright’s understanding of law.
Wright stipulates the condition that armed rivals are “members of a higher group” and bound by its “laws.” I interpret Wright to mean that
they are members of the human species and bound by its natural laws. See Wright (1965), pp. 8ff for his understanding of war, in which even
enduring and implacable rivals are considered members of a “higher group” and subject to its laws. This view accommodates well with the
conception of a human society adopted here. Wright defines war as “the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to
carry on a conflict by armed force.” (His italics) From this perspective, stipulated as the normative and empirical guide for theorizing about
the causes of war through history, Wright views war as a process of violent cooperation between rival groups who “in spite of their
hostility . . . are members of a higher group which originates this law.”
26 United Nations Charter.
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The process of decolonization was only just beginning. It was pursued as much as a function of Cold War
power politics and as a derivative of the politics of national self-determination of previously oppressed peoples.
If the notion of a universal humanity was acknowledged repeatedly in early UN conventions and resolutions,27
the claim of a limit on national power and on nation-state authority, notably with respect to genocide and to
crimes against humanity, had yet to be effectively made. States were expected to protect human rights. They
were not depicted in the UN resolution as their principal threat.
An important first step in constructing the notion of a universal humanity with its superior claims of
protection against genocide begins with reconstructing the past to conform to present experience. Required is
the recasting of the past to reflect its end product: a growing social self-consciousness of the underlying unity of
the world’s populations rooted in their verifiable biological unity.28 Over the sweep of the social evolution of
the species, there is some basis for the expectation, as William McNeill reminds us,29 that the present
populations of the globe have reached a stage of self-awareness sufficient to enlarge their collective notions of
governmental authority to extend beyond the nation-state. They are increasingly conscious for the first time in
history of their common biological beginning, increasing and multiplying socioeconomic and political
interdependencies, moral unity, and shared values—their personal and group survival being primary among
them. This does not necessarily imply that the nation-state will be transcended by a universal state anytime
soon.30 Nor would such a transformation, as Immanuel Kant recognized two centuries ago,31 serve to protect
group identities or solve group conflict. Rather, the authority and sovereignty of the state would be understood
to rest on its pledge to protect universally sanctioned human rights. The transformed psychological and
ideational condition of humans, occasioned by enlarging and thickening socioeconomic and political
exchanges,32 would underpin this lien on state power.
Progress toward civil international governance will require, ironically, a rewriting of history to bring the
past into line with its future projection. Such a reconstruction would privilege the emergence of an
encompassing humanity implied by the evolution of ever broadening social consciousness. A century ago
historians helped form and fashion what Benedict Anderson has termed imagined national communities.33 Their
rewriting of history legitimated the process of strengthening national and state power and authority. Their
recasting of the past to catch up to the future also accelerated the erosion of feudal ways and local ties. This
effort, replicated through the developed states of Europe and North America, also established popular
sovereignty as the authoritative basis for the legitimacy of the state.34 Using the past to rid the future of
genocide as a state or as a group practice will take some doing and a lot of time. But the future lies in the past.
If there is weight to McNeill’s insight about the changing nature of species understanding of who and what
they are and of their rights, as a consequence of enlarging self-consciousness of an underlying unity of
mankind, then an anti-genocide right is embedded, broadly and deeply, within the biosocial evolutionary
process of the human species. Whether this right will survive and thrive will depend on deliberate choice and
willful affirmation rather than on chance or luck. This evolutionary imperative reverses Darwin’s principle of
natural selection. Species cooperation is now essential to its perpetuation. How else can ecological disaster,
controlling weapons of mass destruction, or genocide be addressed? Genocide as a human practice squarely
                                                                        
27 United Nations (1995), pp. 143ff.
28 Jared Diamond poses this problem and sets out to develop the first lineaments of a universal social history of humans, uniting the
biological, social, and environmental factors bearing on the origins of the species and natural selection. William McNeill posits the
hypothesis on which this analysis of the empirical and normative standing of genocide is partially based, viz., that the human species would
appear to have reached a stage of interdependency and knowledge of the positive effects of mutual cooperation sufficient to develop a
universal understanding of the common fate shared by otherwise socially differentiated groups through history. They are poised to eliminate
genocide, much as slavery before, or, more precisely to egg the process along. The argument for an anti-genocide regime will depend on
creating such a species (not specious) identity. McNeill advises historians to interpret the present and future through a reconstruction of the
past, pointing toward this convergence of the human experience, without necessarily effacing the different routes which peoples have taken
through time to get to this still evolving point. See Diamond (1992; 1997).
29 McNeill (1963; 1992).
30 For contrasting views about the fate of the nation-state, consult Evans (1985); Jackson (1993b); Rosenau (1992).
31 Kant (1970).
32 McNeill (1963; 1992). For the globalization of religion and culture Robertson (1992; 1985; 1991). For the over-all process, see
Friedman (1999).
33 McNeill (1992). Also Anderson (1983).
34 On popular sovereignty, see Bendix (1964a; 1964b; 1978).
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joins the issue whether a universal history of mankind, linking past and future, can be delineated and its future
prospects pursued and ensured. If historians and social theorists were indispensable in moving beyond the
constraints of past ways and traditional customs, then the next evolutionary stage is to conceptualize a universal
history for humans as a driving force and as the moral basis of an anti-genocide norm and regime.35
If we now sum up the enlarging record of the civilized practice of an increasingly larger number of states,
treaty obligations to which they are party, the convergence of interest and moral unity of humans implicitly
underlying these treaties, and the informed commentary of legal and political scholars on the question of
genocide, we reach yet another and higher plateau of understanding of the norm of anti-genocide—its
universality. The widening practice among civilized states of rejecting genocide as a policy option is joined to
the treaty obligation under the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. No informed legal or
moral commentator can be found who would justify genocide as protected by the principles of state sovereignty
and noninterference. Whereas the claim has been often made that human rights are a Western creation and serve
only those interests, the claim of freedom from genocide as a human right essentially escapes this relativist
attack. Forbidding genocide in the interests of diversity has general appeal and moral support because it speaks to
a right carried within the personality and group membership of the human species. That this right is recognized
in Western cultural thought (if scarcely always in practice) is no bar to its universal application.
Expanding the Duties of States as Members of a World Society
In signing the Genocide Convention and the UN Charter states join human rights claims to international security
concerns. The exercise of state sovereignty is henceforward incompatible with the practice of genocide. It is
proscribed as an acceptable solution in resolving differences between rival groups within the state or between
the state and challengers to its rule. Ending genocide can thus be credited as an ascendant group right and
superior to any claim to sovereign immunity; it is a universal right deriving from the implied consent of those
governed by states. Under the General Convention states are obliged to “prevent and punish” such practices.36
The state, acting as a state, is obliged, furthermore, to take all feasible measures to prevent just such
eventualities.
A right embedded in the make up of humans as a species extends with compelling logic as a duty to the
agents of the species, viz., states.37 States recognize each other as members of a society of states, bound by
common and shared rules. They acknowledge their sovereign capacity to resolve internal differences and to
defend their populations against foreign aggression and intervention in their domestic affairs. Furthermore, as
an enlargement of the notion of sovereignty, a state today, in renouncing genocide, accepts the qualification that
the recognition by other states of its sovereign authority depends on keeping its anti-genocide pledge at the risk
of forfeiting its claim to legitimacy and, accordingly, its sovereignty. In resorting to genocide, a state or group
aspiring to gain control of state power casts itself outside the society, respectively, of states and peoples; it
becomes an outlaw as it were. Like an individual criminal or band, an outlaw state may well dispose sufficient
material power and command popular support for its genocidal practices.38 Popular support does not diminish
the charge that a state pursuing genocidal practices commits a grave crime against humanity. Culpability for
these crimes is no less attributable to a majority faction of a state’s population than to the state itself and its
                                                                        
35 Kant’s vision of perpetual peace, interestingly enough, was based on free republics and did not envision a central governmental system.
Kant was sensitive to the unique historical, linguistic, and cultural evolution of the species. His notion, too, of a universal ethics is not
portrayed as the consequence of individuals acting separately and independently of each other, but as the product of species interaction—a
collective enterprise. See Kant (1970; 1991), passim. For a discussion of Kant’s internationalism, see Doyle (1997), pp. 251–300.
36 United Nations (1995), p. 151.
37 This analysis rests on the empirical observation that, as the English school persuasively argues, states have imposed constraints on
themselves. These have been relied upon as rules or norms not only to regulate the exchanges between states but also to serve as criteria by
which they are recognized by other states as sovereign and authoritative over the territories which they are govern. These norms inform the
very make up of a state’s identity; its moral equality and its membership within the society of states, quite apart from the material power it
disposes, rest on adherence to these norms. As an ideal model, norms and their self-enforcement converge. The case against genocide and the
call for big state cooperation to eliminate the practice owes much to the English school. See Barkin (1998); Bull (1977; 1984a); Watson
(1984; 1992); Wight (1966). The classic in tracing Western cultural norms on other states is of course Bozeman (1960), years ahead of her
times.
38 Many among the Hutu majority actively joined in the killing. Gourevitch (1998) graphically describes this collective action, captured in
the title of his book which recounts the complicity of a Christian Hutu minister in the killing of members of his own flock.
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officers. In principle, then, genocide is a joint test of state and popular sovereignty. In fusing the notion of
genocide with the civic or public identity of the modern state,39 genocidal behavior, even if confined to the
internal workings of a state and to groups within its borders, becomes international behavior. The anti-genocide
pledge breaches the normative wall, legal and moral, separating the rights and duties owed by states to each
other in their actions towards their own citizens or foreign nationals.40 When genocide or genocidal episodes
erupt, the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of a state, affirmed by the UN Charter, ceases to
have an insulating effect, however much it may still have potency across other domains, including the violation
of other human rights or denials of democratic protections to domestic populations.
If the authority of a state as a socially constructed institution of governance is recognized by other states
because it adheres to the limits imposed by human rights claims, genocide is tantamount to aggression against
other states. It is a crime against a society of states, resting on shared values and principles and rules of
governance. It is no rebuttal to claim that a state cannot commit aggression against its own citizens, since it is
sovereign and protected from outside intervention. In committing genocide, a state loses that cover. It commits
aggression against the right of an historically defined community and its members to exist and replicate their
community and to foster its interests and its values over time within the framework of the nation-state and
nation-state system.
Genocide precludes forever the realization of a people’s right to self-determination. If eliminated as a group
and robbed of their capacity to perpetuate their communities through their offspring, the right to self-
determination is obviously rendered without effect or issue.41 If the right of self-determination is the litmus test
whether armed intervention by third states in the domestic affairs of another state is to be condemned, as some
argue,42 then genocide justifies intervention by the society of states as a right and duty to ensure the self-
determination of a people through time. Much the same way that a domestic criminal act is viewed as a
violation of public order as a whole and of the moral foundation on which that order rests, so genocide occupies
this status in the governance of the peoples and states of the world society. The entire international community
and the nested society of states within this community are potentially exposed to genocidal transgressions.
Genocide, as a strategy and solution to political conflict, is an attack on world order and a grievous affront to
the moral sense of the world community. From these converging moral, legal, and political perspectives, the
distinction between international and domestic politics becomes a distinction without a difference once
genocide appears as the intent or the practical result of the actions of states and groups.
Genocide is now raised to the same status as slavery as a crime against humanity. No state, even the most
tyrannical and authoritarian, would justify slavery today as an acceptable and tolerable practice, even though the
condition of slavery may well continue to define the actual status of large segments of the world’s populations.
Genocide, like slavery, is beyond the pale of acceptable social practice, whether pursued by states or groups; its
renunciation is an essential property of a civilized state as a unit of legitimate government. If states and peoples
act to stop or staunch genocide, wherever and whenever it may arise, their actions fall within the set of
                                                                        
39 Katzenstein (1996); Wendt (1994; 1995), inter alia, discuss at length the construction of the notion of the state and its evolutionary
and volitional make up.
40 The wall still remains intact in all other respects, pending an examination of its defenses against an enlarged attack by human rights
advocates dedicated to an expansionist objective.
41 Slater and Nardin criticize Walzer on this point. Slater (1986). However, it is important to note that Walzer includes mass murder,
illustrated by the Pakistani killing of thousands in Bangladesh, as sufficient cause and justifications for India’s intervention to stop the
bloodshed.
42 Space limits preclude a rehearsing of the debate provoked by Michael Walzer’s condemnation of intervention to frustrate the self-
determination of a people. This debate has been largely surpassed by the completion of the decolonization process. The problem today is not
foreign intervention, notably driven by Cold War incentives, to frustrate self-determination, but building an international consensus and will
to intervene to ensure the self-determination of a people, though not necessarily their right to a separate state. Walzer (1985), p. 164.
Walzer’s Just and Unjust War and subsequent writings provoked an extensive debate over the limits of state sovereignty and its insulation
from outside intervention. This debate is far more wide-ranging than this discussion. The inconclusive character of these exchanges is one of
the justifications for limiting the argument for the mobilization of international will and resources to the eradication of genocide. On this
latter point, all of the participants in the debate are agreed. See the exchanges between Walzer and his critics in Beitz (1995), pp. 165–246.
For a useful effort to bridge these differing perspectives, consult Slater (1986). Laberge (1995) provides a probing comparison between the
ethical positions of Walzer, John Rawls, and Howard Adelman, bearing on the ethics of intervention. Again, whatever their differences, they
still agree on the right and even the duty of states to stop genocide. These responsibilities are not barred by a state’s sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or right to noninterference in its domestic affairs.
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sanctioned international behavior; they do not constitute interferences in the domestic affairs of another state.
Rather, they represent the execution of the state’s duties to uphold the society of states on which its own
authority depends. The principle of noninterference, protected by Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter,
simply does not apply as a defense of genocide.
If states and peoples have won the right to be free from extermination, whatever the scope, depth or
duration of their differences, the claim of genocide to general applicability turns, and not paradoxically, on its
support of personal differentiation, group diversity, cultural richness, and the self-determination of peoples. The
universally acknowledged, if not always honored, principle of self-determination depends on the physical
survival of all contending groups. These refer both to groups in control of a state who are fighting to impose
their will on others and those seeking either the takeover of the state, greater autonomy, or secession. This is a
precondition of their capacity for self-expression, however much frustrated by countervailing force of rivals
determined to suppress them. The claim here is only, and not trivially, that a state or groups within a state
seeking to maintain their control of the state have simply no right, as an unconditional limit on their behavior, to
use genocide in their pursuit of power and interests.
Political conflict and the fight for greater freedom and human rights protections can go on in the sense
meant by John Stuart Mill without necessarily running afoul the charge of genocide. Mill (and Michael Walzer
in his train) insists not only on the right of a community to self-determination but also on the self-help efforts of
indigenous groups to create a political space and identity for themselves in their struggle.43 That sense of
identity, presumably, could not be created by an outside force. That this enterprise might require generations,
with no assurance of success, was (and is) the price that Mill and Walzer believe has to be paid for self-
determination. There should be added the critical condition, however, that keeping open that right through the
effective installation of an anti-genocide regime has now emerged as a imperative on a state in resisting the
defection of portions of its populations seeking their own way—even their own state and territory.
There is nothing in the analysis below that precludes the use of force by a state to use force against its
opponents or to cope with subversive forces, alone or abetted by outsiders, seeking to undermine its authority
and power. Nor do these self-defensive measures justify, in pursuit of an anti-genocide regime, interfering in the
internal affairs of these beset states where the question of genocide is not at issue. The aim here is not to disarm
the state; rather it is to empower states and the principal agents of the international community—the great
powers—to end genocide and to insulate their own politics and differences from its infection. The claim is
narrow in its proposed application yet universal in its reach, viz., to oblige the big powers to end genocide as an
acceptable solution to conflicts between peoples and states
Including Political and Economic Groups within the Genocide Convention
The debate and resulting compromise over the drafting of the Genocide Convention in the early postwar period
excluded political and economic groups, real or socially constructed by genocidal perpetrators, from the four
groups protected under the accord.44 Focused on the experience of World War II and, specifically, on the Nazi
holocaust, the original signers of the Convention limited genocide to “national, ethnical, racial or religious
group[s].”45 Delegates to the Convention were also chary of constraining their national governments in coping
with internal challenges to their rule, a reservation shared by the Soviet delegate and newly emerging national
states.
Enlarging the scope of protected groups, notwithstanding the legal and political problems it poses, is advised
in light of the practices of states and political movements. Genocides committed in Bangladesh (1971), Burundi
(1972), Cambodia (1970s), and Rwanda (1994) problematize the limitation of protection against genocide to the
four groups covered under the Convention. In Burundi and Rwanda, genocides launched alternately by Tutsis or
Hutus against each other since the independence of these two states cannot be easily reduced to readily
discernible and clearly distinguishable bio-historic differences between these groups. As several informed
                                                                        
43 Walzer (1974; 1985).
44 This debate is described in Kuper (1981), Chapter 2, pp. 19–39, and summarized in Institute (1999), pp. 16–20.
45 United Nations (1995), p. 151.
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observers argue,46 these categories have little or no historical justification. They derive from colonial practices in
which German and Belgian authorities and later their French supplanters fashioned these identities as instruments
of political rule and convenience. The Khmer Rouge extended the killing fields of Cambodia to anyone viewed
as an ideological or class opponent of the regime whatever the psychological or moral self-identity possessed by
the individual targeted for elimination. In the civil war between West and East Pakistan, Pakistani troops and
fellow Muslims murdered hundreds of thousands of their co-religious and co-patriots before India intervened to
stop the slaughter.47 It might also be remembered that the killing of millions of Kulaks, small landowners
opposed to Soviet collectivization under the Stalin regime, was a genocide principally justified on economic
grounds. As Ilya Ehrenburg, a Soviet poet, explained the rationale for the elimination of this class: “Not one of
them was guilty of anything, but they belonged to a class that was guilty of everything.”48
Given these and other cases of genocide and of genocidal episodes that might be cited, genocide as a form
of human behavior and political practice should be enlarged to cover the capriciousness of governments or
social movements engaged in mass murder beyond “national, ethnical, racial or religious” groups. Victims are
defined to suit the interests of the perpetrators in their efforts to eliminate all those opposed or resistant to their
political aims.49 To exclude the crime of genocide from what appear on the surface as ideologically or
politically defined groups would not cover significant portions of the world’s populations, Exclusion also
weakens the universality of the principle of personal and group differentiation, the core of the justification for
an anti-genocide regime. This latter principle is more encompassing than the self-determination of peoples. It
embraces any trait valued by individuals in acting or in identifying themselves with a particular group which
might be subject to extermination by another group or the state, simply because of membership in that group
and in which the group’s eradication is the aim of the perpetrators of genocide.50
If the principle of species differentiation, including socially constructed identities and associations, is
accepted as the universal basis for eliminating genocidal practices and cleansing campaigns of all kinds, then
the surface problem of deciding whether human rights are universal or relative to a particular culture disappears
at the point again when genocide arises as a practice. Viewed in this light, a universally justified and applied
anti-genocide regime is difficulty to establish on cultural relativist grounds. To attempt such a move would be
tantamount to emasculating the right of self-determination. What a cultural relativist position affords in the way
of promoting greater tolerance among groups, it takes back in disarming itself before perpetrators of genocide.
They could well then justify their crimes as a consequence of the social and political constraints under which
they labor.
The perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide claimed that they, not the Tutsis and their moderate Hutu
opponents, were victims. They were fighting for “Hutu power,” putatively threatened by their rivals. Organizers
of the genocide pointed to the assassination of the elected Hutu president of neighboring Burundi by Tutsi
soldiers in October 1993. As Alison des Forges writes, this incident, touching off the massacre of tens of
thousands of Burundians, both Hutu and Tutsi, “confirmed the fears of many Rwandan Hutu that Tutsi would
not share power and swelled the numbers supporting Hutu Power.”51 To justify an anti-genocide regime on
relative normative grounds and contrasting political conditions places that claim at fundamental odds with itself.
It is an internally contradictory claim.52 Only an absolute and universal moral stricture can definitively establish
the right to life. Any reservation or condition attached to this prohibition weakens its moral force and the anti-
genocide regime on which it depends for its realization.
An anti-genocide, constraining states and peoples, is absolute and universal, or it is without moral force at
all. What may have been viewed in the past as legitimate—even necessary—by those carrying out genocide is
unjustifiable today under any circumstances. The enlarging consciousness of the shared humanity of the world’s
                                                                        
46 Des Forges (1999); Prunier (1995) persuasively make this point. It is affirmed by the December 1999 UN report on Rwanda, n. 2.
47 Franck (1973).
48 Quoted by Robert Conquest in the New York Times Review of Books, November 21, 1999, p. 22.
49 Arendt (1951) is the classic psychological exploration of the unreserved arbitrariness of totalitarian rule whether from the left or the
right.
50 Jack Donnelly’s identification of human rights as those pertaining to the individual, whether as a member of a group or not, is relevant
here. Donnelly (1989).
51 Des Forges (1999), p. 5.
52 See Pollis (1980); Renteln (1990) for the relativist case.
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populations challenges this rationale. The problem confronting all states and peoples is not only one of
justifying relevant local practices and inherited customs and values in resolving conflicts but also affirming
their applicability in constructing governing rules for a global society of which they and their opponents are no
less members. Claims to be different and to affirmations of separate identities hinge for their validity on the
construction of a society of states and peoples free of the threat of genocide as a universal right. If genocide is
by its very makeup a crime against all humans in their several and historically varied and variable
socioeconomic and political arrangements—what’s real about them as an ontological imperative—then it has
universal applicability as a logical, potentially politically viable, and certainly a legal and moral constraint on all
groups and their agents, most notably states.53
The conditions set down for principled and prudent intervention below to cope with genocide retain many of
the limits affirmed by opponents of intervention, including humanitarian interventions. Specifying the moral and
legal basis of an anti-genocide regime also identifies the guideline for international efforts to work towards its
elimination within the material capabilities and will of the international community at this stage of its evolution.
These guidelines both reflect the slow enlargement of species self-consciousness of its now mutually dependent
social development and give impulse to its extension. By restricting the discussion to genocide as both a right
and duty of the international community—imposed on state and nonstate actors—to prevent and punish its
practice, this discussion also attempts to sidestep without in any way dismissing or diminishing in importance the
much wider ranging and still inconclusive debate over the scope of the right of humanitarian intervention across
a wide range of human right claims beyond that of the privileged right to be free from genocide.54
Reflections on the Rwandan Calamity:
The Limits of the Politics of Genocide
The distinct yet converging sources of support for an anti-genocide regime, outlined above, are indicators,
however provisional, of a gradual sea change in the status of human rights as a constraint on state and group
behavior. The creation of international tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia suggests that the international
community is slowly mobilizing its resources to prosecute perpetrators of genocide.55 The proposed treaty to
create a permanent international court for the prosecution of crimes against humanity also points to growing
international consensus for the strengthening and enlargement of judicial institutions to try and punish those
guilty of serious human rights abuses.56 The intervention of NATO forces into Bosnia suggests, too, that when
the United Nations is unable to act with speed and effectiveness to prevent possible genocide and to protect
human rights, its role can be temporarily filled by the self-help measures of states or by regional organizations
acting on behalf of the United Nations and the international community under Article 51 of the Charter.57
These positive signs still do not add up, however, to the mobilization of resources or the creation of effective
international institutions capable of deterring genocide and genocidal practices. Nor, as the UN Rwandan report
demonstrates, is the international community positioned to prevent genocide from happening whether in Africa
or elsewhere. The Rwandan disaster is matched by similar instances of inaction by the great powers and the
United Nations. To the cases already cited, there can be added the mass killings in Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq,
                                                                        
53 Ramsbotham (1995), pp. 27–32 and citations to some of the relevant debate over the universality or relativity of norms. What seems
clear, however, is that the crime of genocide is not restricted to inter-cultural conflicts. Indeed, the most widespread forms of genocide and
mass murder have been committed by members of the same culture or nation. For a contrary view, particularly in his projection of coming
culture clash, see Huntington (1996).
54 See n. 11.
55 These reforms, however successful, should not be exaggerated as to their import. Most perpetrators have yet to be brought before the bar
of international justice. Litigation is long and tedious and the rule of law is still hostage to political forces beyond the control of the courts.
The Rwandan tribunal in Arusha is especially vulnerable to pressures from the Tutsi-led government on whose support it depends to speed
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trial. New York Times, December 19. 1999.
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which opposes the treaty in its present form.
57 NATO’s intervention into Yugoslavia and its bombing campaign in 1999 to induce the Milosevic regime to permit the return of
Albanian refugees to Kosovo is a controversial issue and is not so easily rationalized as the Bosnian intervention with UN strictures.
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Nigeria, Uganda, Indonesia, and India at the time of its partition. These cover only the most outrageous instances
of genocide. They do not take into account mass murders committed in civil wars in Central and Latin America,
Africa, Asia, and Europe throughout the postwar period.58 The evaluation of Leo Kuper, a close observer of the
United Nation’s record on genocide, still has bite although written almost twenty years ago: “The performance of
the United Nations Organization in the suppression of the crime of genocide is deeply disillusioning, particularly
against the background of the humanitarian ideals which inspired its founding, and which the organization
continues to proclaim—ideals in which the suppression of war, of crimes against humanity and of genocide were
quite central. . . . [A]bove all, it is the rulers of the states of the world who gather together at the United Nations,
and it is mainly, though not exclusively, the rulers who engage in genocide.”59
If the moral and legal standards condemning genocide are clear enough, however narrowly drawn at the
present time, what factors explain, then, this lamentable record of lapses, willful neglect, and abject failure to
prevent genocide? Why the huge gap between almost universal moral condemnation of genocide and the paltry
efforts to end genocide and genocidal practices like those in Rwanda and Burundi, the Balkans, or in
Cambodia? The Rwandan genocide of 1994 exposes the principal structural constraints—political, economic,
and psychological—that effectively block the creation of an anti-genocide regime. These constraints remain
formidable obstacles to reform. They comprise a check list of what impediments have to be relaxed and
surmounted if those peoples exposed to genocide can confidently rely on an international regime for their
security rather than on their own self-help efforts. As the experience in Rwanda and Burundi since their
independence suggests, a vicious circle emerges as genocidal practices become an option to be exercised within
the modus operandi of all groups implicated in these struggles.
The Rwandan Genocide and Obstacles to Reform60
On August 4, 1993, the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda and the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front
(RPF) signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. The United Nations was assigned a broad range of security functions
to implement the accord. It was expected to provide a Neutral International Force to mediate between contending
Hutu and Tutsi forces. The functions spelled out in the accord were a mix of Chapter VI peacekeeping and
Chapter VII peacemaking operations. The UN contingent was supposed “to guarantee the overall security of the
country and verify the maintenance of law and order, ensure the security of the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, and to assist in catering [sic.] to the security of civilians.”61 UN forces were also supposed to assist in
tracking down arms caches in cooperation with government units, neutralizing armed gangs throughout the
country, supervising the demobilization of servicemen and gendarmes, and tracking down violators of the
agreement.62
From the start, the UN reneged on fulfilling its commitments under the Arusha accord. The United Nations
Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), initially projected as a force of 4,260, was cut to 2,548 by the
Security Council. Its mandate was limited to Chapter VI functions associated with the pacific settlement of
disputes. Its neutrality was affirmed in restricting the force to its own self-defense. Military operations were to
be conducted only in cooperation with governmental forces. That rule of engagement was itself at odds with the
professed neutral stance of the United Nations since that aligned the UN with many in the government who
would later take part in the genocide. UNAMIR was also largely limited to operations in the capital city of
Kigali. The deployment of this force, scheduled to be on the ground a month after the Arusha agreement, was
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60 There are several thorough and well-informed studies of the Rwandan genocide. They provide the basis for identifying the root causes
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61 UN report, n. 2, p. 3.
62 Ibid.
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delayed for three months as a consequence of UN headquarters and Security Council foot-dragging and
bureaucratic inertia.
Growing signs of a possible genocidal outbreak were systematically ignored by UN officials, although a
report to the Commission on Human Rights had voiced concern about “the possibility” that “a genocide was
being committed in Rwanda.”63 General Roméo Dallaire, UNAMIR’s commander, was not informed of these
findings. The UNAMIR mission subsequently received reports form the field of well-planned incidents in
which upwards of 60 people were killed. The assassination of the president of neighboring Burundi further
signaled coming genocide. The UNAMIR mission acknowledged later that it did not have the intelligence
capability on the ground to fully assess reports of mass murders, nor to follow up on NGO warnings of
impending genocide.
These intelligence breakdowns, against a history of genocide and genocidal outbreaks in Rwanda and
Burundi between Hutus and Tutsis, were capped by the cable sent by Dallaire on January 11, 1994, to the
Military Adviser of the Secretary–General. A Rwandan informant leaked the plans of extremist Hutu elements
to assassinate opposition deputies and to kill Belgian soldiers to prompt their withdrawal, leaving the plotters a
free hand to eliminate their Tutsi and Hutu rivals. For reasons still to be determined, UN Headquarters ignored
these warning signs. In January and February the Security Council, led by the United States, rebuffed requests
from the field, strongly seconded by Belgium, to increase the UNAMIR force. Still smarting from the setback of
October 1993 in Somalia where eighteen Marines were killed by clan forces, Washington instructed its
representative to oppose any expansion in UNAMIR’s mandate or force capabilities. Joined by his British
counterpart, the American ambassador to the United Nations cited the costs of expanding UN forces and the
alleged damage that such a move would have on UN peacekeeping responsibilities.
On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down by unidentified forces on his
return from a meeting in Dar es Salaam to implement the Arusha accord. The killing set off a well-planned and
orchestrated genocide launched by extremist Hutu elements that opposed the Arusha compromise. In three
months the army and Presidential Guard forces, abetted by civilian sympathizers and those impressed into
service, murdered an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsis. .64 Thousands more were maimed
for life, families and communities permanently disrupted, and an estimated two million more uprooted and
driven to refugees camps. Adversely affected were upwards of 15–25 percent of the population. About 8 to 10
percent of the population was eliminated almost overnight by the most primitive of means.65 A similar level of
killing in the United States or in the European Union would have resulted in approximately 25 million deaths,
an almost unimaginable man-made disaster paralleling World War I casualty levels. Most of the killings fell, of
course, on the Tutsi minority of approximately 657,000. Several sources cite about 500,000 Tutsis killed or
about 75 percent of their number.
The reactions of the United Nations, member states, and the permanent members of the Security Council
were in direct counterpoint to what would have been necessary to reduce the scale of the massacre and to
restore order. Even as reports of mass murder where being received in New York, the Security Council was
preparing to cut the UN force to 270. Meanwhile, Belgium unilaterally withdrew its forces in the aftermath of
the execution of ten Belgian peacekeepers by the Presidential Guard. Dallaire also lost control over important
segments of his remaining forces. Many abandoned their posts, leaving those whom they were protecting to
their genocidal predators. These included the opposition prime minister and several other ministers as well as
thousands of ordinary Rwandans, mostly Tutsis, who had mistakenly entrusted their security to UN forces.
Six weeks later, when much of the killing was already over, the United Nations was still fixed on its
original mandate of peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the Charter. UN Headquarters, bolstered by a stubborn
Security Council, insisted on neutrality in the civil war in the face of mounting evidence of a full-scale genocide
in progress. But even that stance was compromised in the UN’s authorization of French intervention in June
under Operation Turquoise. While the French commander spoke of “putting the Arusha Accords back into
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operation,”66 military officers in Paris were quoted as saying that they were bent on “breaking the back of the
RPF (the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front).”67 Paris had long supported the Hutu-dominated government against
the Tutsi insurrection.68 While France’s intervention apparently saved many Rwandans from death, there is little
doubt that its temporary occupation of sectors of Rwanda impeded the takeover of Rwanda by RPF force.69 In
seizing control of the country, the RPF, not the French or the United Nations, ended the genocide.
As the reports of the genocide could no longer be ignored or rationalized as killings which were the
inevitable outcropping of a civil war, the UN Security Council acted on May 17 to authorize UNAMIR II and a
force of 5500 to stop the genocide. By July, two months after the passage of this resolution, only a tenth of this
force had been cobbled together, principally from African states. They were reserved about providing forces
unless the costs of the operation were fully funded by the United Nations. The latter could not give these
assurances. The United Nations was deeply in debt due to past peacekeeping operations. Its most powerful
member, the United States, was a billion dollars in arrears on its assessed payments, largely the consequence of
U.S. Congressional objections to UN birth control policies.
The Security Council’s willful inaction added to the Rwandan misery. As the UN Report concluded, “[T]he
lack of political will to react firmly against the genocide when it began was compounded by a lack of
commitment by the broader membership of the United Nations to provide the necessary troops in order to
permit the United Nations to try to stop the killing.”70 When UNAMIR II forces did finally arrive on station,
they were still hampered by a narrowly conceived mandate out of touch with the enormity of the genocide and
overwhelmed by the flood of refugees generated by the catastrophe. Once concentrated in camps, the refugees
quickly fell under the control of fleeing Hutu perpetrators of the genocide. UN forces impeded RPF efforts to
clear the camps of these murderous elements. Their presence unwittingly shielded the perpetrators of genocide
from capture, while supplying the latter material aid inasmuch as UN assistance to the refugees had to pass
through the hands of Hutu extremists in control of the camps.
If the Rwandan genocide is probed more deeply, its seeds can be found in the flawed beginnings of the
Rwandan state. When a Hutu-dominated government seized power in the early 1960s, it forced thousands of
Tutsis into refugee status, many spilling into the other states of the Great Lakes region of Uganda, Burundi,
Tanzania, and Zaire. This created a state of almost permanent civil war between the Hutu government and Tutsi
refugees. Each was induced to seek outside support. These counter moves inevitably expanded the civil war to
include third parties. If the Hutu government enjoyed the patronage of Belgium and France, the Tutsis, as
losers, were obliged to repair principally to neighboring Uganda for succor and sanctuary. In time, they
intervened in the Ugandan civil war, trading on their service to use Ugandan territory as a springboard for
strikes against the Hutu government. Self-determination was being defined largely by the edge of a machete or
the barrel of a gun in overlapping and reinforcing civil wars across several African state borders. Intervention in
the domestic politics of all states of the region was the rule rather than the exception. Treaty and cease-fire
accords were also honored more in the breach than in their observance. The Arusha accord of August 1993
between Hutu and Tutsi elements became, paradoxically, the incubator for the genocide some nine months later.
Aggrieved extremists, marginalized in this agreement, hatched a plot for a final solution against their Tutsi
rivals and those Hutus who stood in their way.71
As far as most permanent members of the Security Council were concerned (France excepted), Rwanda and
Burundi, small stakes in the Cold War, were of little interest. Allowed to run to an end game, the Hutu–Tutsi
rivalry not only led to the unspeakable genocide of 1994, but its repercussions were subsequently felt, as they
still are, throughout central Africa. The RPF overturned the Hutu government. Its scattered remnants fled to the
refugee camps girdling Rwanda. Meanwhile, the civil war in Rwanda rapidly spread to Zaire. The
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Banyarwanda, who share the language and culture of the surrounding states but who had lived for generations in
Zaire, became the targets of a fading Kinshasa regime in its death throes. All of the Great Lakes states were
drawn into the vortex of a civil war extending throughout central Africa. The Mobutu Sésé Séko regime
collapsed by force of arms, and Zaire was transformed into the new and shaky state of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The latter has since been essentially dismembered, conceivably permanently, by uprisings against
the new government, supported by the interventions of neighboring self-interested states and by civil wars
spilling across its frontiers.72 Borders are now essentially up-for-grabs throughout the central spine of Africa,
stretching from the Congo and the Great Lakes states to the Horn and Sudan. The carving up of Africa by the
European powers at the Berlin conference in 1885 has begun anew but now at the initiative of the self-
emasculating peoples of the continent. A United Nations, charged to protect the sovereignty and independence
of nation-states, finds that its central mandate has been undermined by its own inaction. And the international
order on which the member states depend, notably the great powers, is also implicitly at risk.
Limits of Reform: The Politics of Genocide
So why was nothing done? Why does the disclosure of past genocides and those waiting to erupt not move the
international community to action to prevent these disasters that threaten both human rights and international
order? Identifying these constraints and the incentives they generate in world politics for state behavior and
group rivalry in coping with genocide are a precondition for devising workable strategies to eventually end this
practice. The root cause of failure lies primarily in the weaknesses of a decentralized system of nation-states as
the principal unit of governance and order of the world society. Each state is preoccupied with its own
immediate, security interests. Many are beset, too, by divided populations. These conditions pose their own
demanding security dilemmas. These parochial but by no means trivial concerns seriously inhibit collective
efforts to install and institutionalize a working anti-genocide regime; i. e., security guarantees on which targeted
populations can rely for their safety, an assurance conspicuously absent in the extension of UN guarantees to
exposed elements of the Rwandan citizenry.73
Armed intervention and the violation of state sovereignty, even when aimed at ending genocide, run
counter (as often as not) to the interests of nation-states as they are conceived today. This is especially the case
when the interests of the great powers are at play. China, if overwhelmingly cohesive as a racial and culturally
defined society, still faces serious ethnic minority pressures on its peripheries, most notably those arising from
its forced assimilation of Tibet. If the Tiananmen Square massacre is prologue, the Beijing regime sits
precariously atop currently suppressed but still pervasive pressures from within to liberalize the regime. The
determined efforts of the Beijing government to smash the Falun Gong, a semi-religious cult, evidence
Beijing’s fears that any group not directly under its control is a political threat to its survival. There remains,
too, the schismatic split between the mainland and Taiwan and the continuing intervention of the United States
and Western states to prevent Taiwan’s forceful submission to Beijing’s rule. NATO’s bombing in Yugoslavia,
resulting in the mistaken targeting of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo intervention, cannot
but give pause to Chinese leaders, conservatives or reformers, when they contemplate any authorization of force
to be conducted by the United Nations or by any other regional organization or state. These concerns converge
to severely limit any Chinese interest in instituting an anti-genocide regime that might limit the Beijing regime’s
responses to real or perceived threats to its rule.
Russia’s violence prone problems of identity politics, exemplified by the Chechnyan debacle, further
illustrate why Moscow is not keen to support armed interventions by other states. Russian resistance to NATO’s
expansion is also deeply rooted in concerns about the possible uses of Western military superiority to impeded
or preclude Russia efforts to suppress internal ethnic and national divisions or to aid its Russian co-nationals in
the near abroad. Both Russia and China prefer traditional great power politics, spheres of influence and power
balances, as a modus operandi, in fending off external intervention when coping with internal division. Human
rights claims, pressed by other states or international organizations, limit their ability to throttle opponents to
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their rule. Humanitarian intervention is also perceived as working against their interests if they believe
themselves to be submitting to Western and, specifically, to U.S. policies and power. China’s abstention on the
Security Council resolution, authorizing NATO’s peacemaking in Kosovo, and Russia’s conditional
cooperation in occupying parts of Kosovo, trace the current limits of big power accord in dealing with ethnic
cleansing, genocide, and massive movements of refugees as the product of such practices.
These same reservations animate the interests of other potentially emerging major powers like India and
Indonesia (the second and fifth most populous states). Self-determination for Kashmir challenges the legitimacy
of the Indian state. The loss of that province by ballot or by bullets is seen by Delhi as encouraging communal
clashes and increased demands by groups within India for greater autonomy and even for secession. Racial and
communal strife are also the principal dangers facing the post–Suharto regime in Indonesia. The economic
meltdown of the Indonesian economy and the disarray of the Jakarta government have intensified powerful
ethnic divisions stretching from Borneo to East Timor. These emerging mega-states, in population if not
advanced technological development, are bedeviled by internal group struggles over religious, cultural, regional
and linguistic loyalties. In confronting these contending pressures, the state and its armed forces are scarcely
neutral observers. They are actively engaged, with force at the ready, in shaping their direction and impact.
Particular attention should also be paid to the reservations of the United States concerning an anti-genocide
regime. Its cooperation is vital. Enlisting its support cannot be taken for granted. Powerful interests work
against cooperation. First, past U.S. behavior is not above reproach. Many view the dropping of atomic bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as acts of genocide. To these indictments many add the behavior of American
forces in the developing world throughout the Cold War period and after. Vietnam is illustrative. Carpet
bombing, the creation of concentration camps, the Cambodian intervention—paving the way for Khmer Rouge
atrocities—and subsequent opposition to Vietnamese invasion to end the Cambodian genocide open the United
States to charges of mass murder. This record is subject to re-examination if genocide rises in importance on the
agenda of global governance.74
The resistance of the United States to the creation of an international court to prosecute those guilty of
crimes against humanity amplifies the incentives inducing U.S. policymakers to go slow. Official Washington
objects to what is viewed as an open-ended court mandate to prosecute international criminals. The court’s
prosecutorial powers may then extend to U.S. military forces, not to mention American political leaders, in the
absence of a Washington veto over the court’s jurisdiction and agenda. American officials cite reports that the
U.S. military was under investigation by the Hague tribunal as evidence to substantiate these fears. A U.S.
Department of Defense official is quoted as saying the “Pentagon remained adamantly opposed to any external
jurisdiction over the American military, regardless of the [Hague] tribunal’s jurisdiction in this case.”75
These legal objections mask deeper domestic political opposition to support for an anti-genocide regime.
These are reflected in the long fight over U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention. Groups, like the
prestigious American Bar Association, successfully blocked ratification by arguing that the Convention
contravened the American constitution. These objections were overcome only in 1988, four decades after the
Convention had been initially promoted and signed by the United States. In addition, American public opinion,
however much it may be moved by humanitarian purposes as support for the initial intervention in Somalia
suggests, remains skeptical that vital national interests are at stake in the civil wars of other states.76 Efforts to
prevent or limit the destructiveness of these conflicts are widely understood to be costly. Many believe, too, that
enduring rivalries are not resolvable by force. Prevailing U.S. military doctrine also conspires with domestic
resistance to humanitarian interventions. When they have been launched, as in Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo, either
overwhelming local power or long-range striking airpower has been relied upon to keep casualties to a
minimum. Indeed, even as the deaths were mounting in Rwanda in the spring of 1994, the Clinton
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administration was putting the finishing touches on Presidential Decision Directive 25 to limit U.S. military
involvement in projected multilateral peace operations.77
Even if these reservations of popular opinion and military strategy could be overcome, there would remain
the very real and pressing question of burden sharing in any intervention to stop genocide and in the subsequent
costs of reconstructing a torn society. The much-preferred course for armed intervention today is a multilateral
approach. This sets obstacles for intervention when timely unilateral measures may be called for. Collective
actions take time, precisely what is not available in a genocidal crisis. Through joint action, great powers
acquire a mantle of protective legitimacy in using their military power. They are also able to apportion burdens
within the coalition to limit free riding. In turn, alliance partners naturally resist legitimizing actions over which
they have little say or leverage. They are also not keen on accepting costs and risks at odds with what they
perceive are their vital interests. These tensions over burden sharing, political responsibility for peacemaking
and societal reconstruction, and control over military forces explain much of the difficulty of putting together a
workable coalition to rid world politics of genocide. These considerations encourage states to strive to retain as
much freedom of political action and as much autonomous control of its military forces as possible.78 As a
consequence, international coalitions against genocide are fragile. Small states, too, are no less reluctant to sign
a blank check in joining in collective security operations. Note how rapidly Belgium withdrew its forces from
Rwanda in the wake of relatively few military casualties, when compared to the genocide about to explode, and
the impotence of Dutch troops under UN command in their failure to create a safe haven in Srebernica for
Bosnian Muslims as the UN had promised.
Conversely, it should also be recognized that the principles of sovereignty and noninterference in the
domestic affairs of other states, whatever their manifest shortcomings as a remedy for genocide, serve important
values of peace, if not always those of justice. For good reasons, these are enshrined in the UN Charter and
specifically sanctioned by Article 2 (4). With all its weaknesses, the nation-state is still the only unit of
governance that commands the loyalty and support of most of the world’s divided populations. It provides then
a decentralized solution to global governance for which there is no readily available alternative.79 Imperial
solutions have been systematically rejected by self-determined populations. The Soviet Empire imploded
largely as a consequence of these fissiparous forces, partially a victim of its own internal policies toward
nationalities.80 The likelihood of ridding the world of genocide will have to be achieved, paradoxically, through
the resistant medium of the nation-state system and through the dynamics of great power politics if it is ever to
be successfully realized at all. The great powers are not prepared to permit interventions on their soil for
humanitarian purposes. They will intervene elsewhere only if such initiatives are consistent with their perceived
interests.81 Proposals to seek great power cooperation to end genocide must be calculated to address—and to
gradually relax—the negative incentives inhibiting big power cooperation to end this practice. This sobering
reminder defines the scope of what reforms are feasible and promise some likelihood of adoption by the big
powers in the foreseeable future.
Strengthening an Anti-Genocide Regime:
Lessons from Rwanda
If eliminating genocide were the sole aim of international actors in world politics and the central interest of the
great powers, the task of realizing this goal would be easy enough. Given current thinking about the problem,82
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a hard-hitting, fast-reacting fighting force of 15,000 troops, backed by another 45,000 of support and logistical
personnel, would be adequate for most humanitarian interventions. Even a much small force of 5,000 troops
might be adequate for many crises, like Rwanda. In an oft-repeated statement, General Dallaire declared that
such a force could have saved thousands if rapidly deployed; it might have even deterred its eruption if it had
been readily available:
In Rwanda, the international community’s inaction contributed to the Hutu extremists’ belief that
they could carry out their genocide. UNAMIR could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of
people. As evidence, with the 450 men under my command during this interim, we saved and directly
protected over 25,000 people and moved tens of thousands between the combat lines. A force of 5,000
personnel, if rapidly deployed, could have prevented the massacres in the south and west of that
country, massacres which didn’t start until early May, nearly a month after the start of the war.83
A dedicated, international force under UN control and under the authority and direction of the Security
Council has clear advantages over the current situation of designing forces after the outbreak of a crisis. Under
present standby agreements, states earmark forces and resources to the United Nations. Evaluations of these
arrangements have questioned their effectiveness.84 A dedicated and independent UN force would solve many
of the problems associated with seconded national forces as a response to genocide, to human rights violations,
and to peacekeeping and peacemaking obligations. Unlike a standby approach, a UN force would be uniformly
trained and equipped; transport and logistical support would be readily available; problems of communications,
command, control and intelligence—glaring lapses in Rwanda—would be ironed out; and military doctrine
covering the deployment, rules of engagement, and varied roles that UN forces would discharge would be
incorporated into over-all military planning before an operation were initiated.
Most importantly, these would be all volunteer forces. They would not be under national control, nor be
subject to the competing demands of divided loyalty to dual commands. A UN volunteer force, as Brian
Urquhart argues, would be “designed to fill a very important gap in the armory of the Security Council, giving it
the ability to back up preventive diplomacy with a measure of immediate peace enforcement. . . . The volunteer
force would be trained in the techniques of peacekeeping and negotiation as well as in the more bloody business
of fighting.”85 However apt and compelling Urquhart’s proposal may be, Susan Sewell’s assessment of the
prospects of an autonomous UN peacekeeping force appears conclusive: a “United Nations standing force is
simply not going to happen.”86 Big power interests, real and perceived, preclude the realization of this ambitious
aim anytime soon. So what might “happen” to move toward the ideal of an all-volunteer international force to
deter genocide, to limit the scope of episodic eruptions, and to lay the groundwork for the reconstruction of
failed states?
Several converging factors provide the grounds for guarded optimism that some progress can be made
toward institutionalizing an anti-genocide regime. First, there is the widening recognition of the horrors of
genocide and the threats this practice poses to international security. What happened in Rwanda was
subsequently repeated, if in diminished measure, in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and in the Great Lakes region.
The decisions of the Security Council to send peacekeeping forces to the Congo and East Timor are in response
to these concerns. Second, a bolstered moral and legal consensus against genocide, as outlined earlier, would
swell pressures on states to mobilize their resources and will to strengthen an anti-genocide regime. Third, there
is growing and compelling evidence of the costs of genocide. There is increased appreciation of the fact that it
costs more in blood and treasure to repair a damaged nation or region than to invest international capital in its
socioeconomic and political development to preclude the outbreak of genocide.
Fourth, there is an expanded international and domestic judicial base to try perpetrators of crimes against
humanity. The Hague and Arusha tribunals reflect rising international pressures to bring perpetrators to justice.
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Recent convictions of accused violators by both tribunals evidence the resolve of the international community
to punish offenders. The Pinochet case also suggests that domestic courts can be used to limit the degree to
which the principles of state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of another state can shield
those accused of grievous human rights abuses from being prosecuted. Former Chilean strongman, General
Augusto Pinochet, was held by British authorities on the warrant of a Spanish prosecutor to stand trail for
having committed crimes against humanity while in power. That General Pinochet was granted leave to return
to Chile on humanitarian grounds of ill health does not diminish the potential significance of future reliance on
this precedent to expand the jurisdiction of domestic courts to bring those accused of crimes against humanity
before the bar of international justice. That precedent is already being extended in Senegal where former
Chadian president Hissène Habré has been arraigned before a domestic court to face charges of torture while he
was in office.87
Finally, strengthening the international institutional foundation against genocide can be reckoned to have a
positive feedback effect on big power cohesion and cooperation. In cooperatively developing coping
mechanisms against genocide, the great powers build mutual confidence in each other. Their conflicts with each
other can conceivably be muted by joining in such collective actions. In turn, the tensions currently reflected in
the conflicting claims of national and international security can be relaxed, if not fully resolved, by converging
big power efforts to eliminate genocide as an acceptable and tolerable way to settle differences between peoples
and states. This shared experience can serve over time to relax the security dilemmas they confront in pursuing
their national security interests. All this will, of course, take time. The gains already made in creating the
foundation for an anti-genocide regime provide a springboard for further, if circumscribed, progress.
An anti-genocide regime can be given impulse and direction, a fillip to international security and human
rights, by the adoption of some or all of the following proposals: (1) strengthening UN intelligence capabilities;
(2) enhancing its capacity for local political risk analysis; (3) clarifying the criteria for applicable responses
under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter; (4) creating a military staff committee; (5) improved earmarking
of military forces from national contingents for Chapter VI and VII operations; (6) developing closer liaison and
joint planning and operations between the UN and regional security organizations and their member states; and
(7) coordinating UN, state, and nongovernmental organizations in dispensing humanitarian assistance and in
meeting the needs of refugees in postgenocide episodes.88
Intelligence Capabilities
Article 34 of the Charter, now largely fallow, should be activated to expand the intelligence services under the
Secretary–General. 89 Article 34 authorizes the Security Council to investigate “any dispute, or any situation
which . . . is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” Greater transparency is a
precondition for the mobilization of international resources and will to prevent the full-scale outbreak of
genocide and to limit its destructiveness once unleashed. Increased staff is needed to strengthen the UN’s
capacity to identify the signs or precursors of genocide and episodes of mass killings. The United Nations does
not have its own satellite reconnaissance systems. Nor does it possess its own global communications network
capable of providing up-to-date intelligence on fast-breaking events. There are no daily briefings to inform
United Nations officials whether ongoing conflicts are getting out of hand or those which, now smoldering, are
about to explode in violent conflict.
The effectiveness of an expanded intelligence service in the office of the Secretary–General would also
depend on its own ability to access the more developed and extensive intelligence services of national states. A
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dedicated staff of intelligence experts under UN control would have the capacity to tap into the extensive
intelligence networks and data systems available to member states. Their specialized knowledge would equip
them with the expertise needed to know what to look for and whom to consult around the globe for data and
intelligence. These UN services would be closely linked to media and NGO sources. As the Rwandan
experience evidences, these outlets are often better informed about conditions leading to genocide than national
intelligence services and governments. In contrast to the latter, a UN intelligence service would have less
incentive to mute or suppress reports and information about atrocities or the scope of genocidal episodes
impacting negatively on particular national interests.
Strengthened United Nation’s intelligence capabilities might well not have prevented the Rwandan
genocide. States and the United Nations must have the political will to act on this intelligence. An enlarged
intelligence system, with connections to other governments, NGOs, and the world media, would have made it
difficult, nevertheless, to bury the warnings issuing from different avenues about coming trouble in Rwanda.
General Roméo Dallaire’s January cable to UN headquarters was never disclosed to the members of the
Security Council or to its New Zealand President.90 A UN intelligence service, independent of operational
responsibilities, would be charged not only to collect data but also to integrate the information flowing from
these diverse sources to establish whether a genocide or genocidal episode was in the offing. Whereas in the
past UN Headquarters did not follow up on reports from the field about plans or incidents associated with
genocide, a UN intelligence service would be expected to pursue leads triggered by reports of impending
genocide as a matter of routine. Armed with superior intelligence, UN officials would then be in a position,
directly or through media leaks, to contest attempts by a member state to dismiss or minimize reports of
widespread human rights abuses. The continued participation of a representative of the Hutu government in the
deliberations of the Security Council, as the genocide unfolded, underscores the importance of an independent
and disinterested assessment of information as a precondition for UN action.91
Political Risk Analysis
Beyond acquiring access to a greater range of diverse and reliable sources of data, the UN Secretary–General
also requires more personnel capable of conducting ongoing risk analyses of brewing crises. This implies
increasingly sophisticated understanding of local socioeconomic, political, and ideological conditions. These are
the breeding grounds for genocide. It also implies an integrated organizational structure capable of
identifying—measuring where possible—and evaluating patterned behavior as precursors of genocide or
imminent outbreaks of genocidal attacks.92 The absence of such informed evaluations and organizational
capacity was conspicuous throughout the Rwandan crisis. UN officials and representatives of the permanent
members of the Security Council were repeatedly surprised, outpaced, and outsmarted by the perpetrators of
genocide. These breakdowns were numerous and chronic throughout the crisis from the Arusha accords through
the refugee crisis. (They still persist, incidentally, in the UN’s responses to the continuing crisis in the Great
Lakes region.)93
The absence of expert, real-time knowledge of the political situation on the ground precluded a mandate
and rules of engagement for UNAMIR responsive to the political forces working toward genocide. This lapse
proved fatal to hundreds of thousands of Rwandans. Political leadership in the United Nations was unaware that
extremists in the Habyarimana government, fearful of a loss of power, were determined to prevent the
implementation of the Arusha accords at all costs.94 UN Headquarters evaluated the crisis strictly as a civil war
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between Hutu and Tutsi forces. UNAMIR’s mandate was to facilitate the Arusha accords. These were premised
on the false assumption that all elements of the warring sides were prepared to honor the cease-fire and to
cooperate in organizing a power sharing, coalition government. UNAMIR’s facilitating role pivoted then on
remaining neutral. Its neutral stance bore no relevance to the real situation confronting Rwandan citizens,
notably its minority Tutsi population, UNAMIR forces, or UN civilian personnel. A continuous flow of updated
field reporting and more informed political understanding of the evolving crisis would have called into question
the UNAMIR’s mandate, rules of engagement, and counterproductive stance of neutrality. Instead, the gap
between mandate and the force requirements to deter or limit the genocide grew as the holocaust unfolded. The
mandate and rules of engagement, cast in Chapter VI peacekeeping terms, acted as cognitive blocks to new and
disturbing reports about preparations for genocide.95 These policy decisions and, arguably, the willfully directed
misperceptions driving them had the untoward effect of enlisting the UN’s cooperation in the genocide.
Close observers of the Rwanda genocide might still be skeptical that more informed and real-time ready
political evaluations would have provoked prompt Security Council action to stem the killing. Domestic
pressures in response to the Somalian disaster, cited in retrospective evaluations of the calamity, may well have
prevented American and Western decision makers from supporting timely UN authorization to intervene in
Rwanda.96 Acknowledging these possibilities does not diminish the value of fixing responsibility for inaction
even in retrospect. More sophisticated political analysis serves as a potential, if partial, antidote to future flights
from responsibility. Strengthening and institutionalizing greater transparency and accountability in UN decision
making are preconditions for continuous review of UN authorized interventions to determine whether Chapter
VI operations apply or whether events on the ground dictate Chapter VII measures.
There should be no illusion about the impact of greater transparency and accountability. They have not
proved decisive before in reforming the United Nations or in positioning the organization to assume enlarged
security responsibilities. Conversely, it is difficult to see how international public opinion can be otherwise
mobilized and progress toward institutionalizing an anti-genocide regime can be made unless greater openness
and the allocation of responsibility are continuing elements of UN decisional processes. In this vein,
Secretary–General Kofi Annan can be credited for having given impetus to this shift by commissioning a report
on the Rwandan crisis that did not spare him in criticizing his role in the UN’s failure. This is a useful precedent
in establishing the degree to which the international community, the United Nations, and the Security Council
may have failed in carrying out their Charter responsibilities.97 Samantha Power forcefully joins the issue:
“Next time, when somebody asks, ‘why did nobody act to stop the horror in Rwanda?’ we should place
ourselves in a position to respond not with the overused and uninformative phrase, ‘there was no political will,’
but with the more constructive, ‘because so and so and so and so and so and so chose not to do such and such
for the following reasons.’”98 The marshaling of international political will starts with knowledge of the aims to
which that will is to be directed. Better intelligence and risk analysis capabilities are helpful in leading an
otherwise blind, indifferent, or distracted international will to a clear and compelling goal—an anti-genocide
regime.
Criteria Defining Chapter VI and VII Missions
The failures of UN intelligence and evaluative mechanisms as well as the deliberate refusal of the Security
Council to address threats to international security also raise into question the shortcomings of Chapter VI and
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. More precisely, the authority vested in the United Nations by these chapters for
peacekeeping and peacemaking functions requires clearer definition and relevant criteria to relate existing
international authority and institutional mechanisms for intervention to effective field operations. These chapters
do not serve as useful guides to cope with threats to international security, particularly those posed by genocide.
The roles and functions assigned to the United Nations under the Arusha accords spanned both chapters. These
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were realistically delineated by the negotiators of the agreement. The long history of genocide and genocidal
episodes characterizing the conflictual relations of the principals and their well-based mutual suspicions of each
other’s motives argued for a powerful UN presence and for a wide-range of security roles. UN Headquarters and
the Security Council, with the United States in the lead, refused to underwrite this commitment.
If Chapter VI and VII powers had been viewed as a seamless web of responses to threats to international
security, then enhanced UN intelligence and evaluative tools might have assisted UN decision makers in
determining what set of capabilities, mandate, and rules of engagement were appropriate to cope with a crisis.
Forces could have been equipped and configured to meet these challenges rather than limited by a Charter
straightjacket ab initio with little regard for its relevance to meet security threats in the field. States and the
publics to which they are subject may resist shouldering these obligations. Whether they will be assumed or not
will largely depend on perceived national interests. The utility of a more realistic understanding of the
requirements of international security than is presently reflected in debates within the Security Council is that it
would provide criteria to evaluate Security Council decisions and those of national governments to determine
whether they were addressing security problems at a level of seriousness and complexity relevant to their
solution. Scholastic debates over the scope of Chapters VI and VII obscure the underlying obligation of the
United Nations and the Security Council to end genocide.
Military Staff Committee
The United Nations ad hocs all of its peacekeeping missions. These are now more complex than just sending in
foreign troops at the invitation of the receiving state. They extend increasingly to preventive and coercive
diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, and socioeconomic and political
reconstruction.99 Where genocide is rampant, there will be no welcome mat to prepare the way for intervening
forces. What is needed, therefore, is the activation of Articles 46 and 47 of the UN Charter. This would create a
standing military staff to execute Security Council policies. A military committee, composed of senior officers
of the major powers, would be charged with developing plans for possible armed intervention into potential
genocide sites. They would act like any military staff. They would be expected to develop training, logistical,
communications, and equipment needs adapted to a range of different geographic and regional conditions and
varied political circumstances. UN planning would entail immediate access to nationally earmarked military
forces. These units would have been professionally trained, equipped, and psychologically prepared for armed
engagement, if necessary, to quell the outbreak or practice of genocide. The staff, much after the pattern
established in NATO, would also work out the lines of communication, command, and control procedures for
these UN forces. They would define and continually update rules of engagement consistent with the protection
of civil populations and UN personnel.
Since the control of the staff would reflect the privileged position of the permanent members of the
Security Council, these two organs should be expected to move in lockstep—or not at all. If big power cohesion
can be achieved, then the United Nations and the Security Council would be equipped with the means to
execute its will. Needless to say none of these elements was in place during the Rwandan crisis. UNAMIR I
was more than a failure in political will on the part of the Security Council. Those forces dispatched under this
authorization were also ill-equipped and poorly trained to discharge even the restricted mandate to which they
were assigned. Troops from Bangladesh, in particular, were ill-prepared to assume their peacekeeping roles.
They brought no transport equipment with them, nor adequate stocks of arms to operate effectively as military
units. At the first sign of being in harm’s way many bolted their posts. UNAMIR II did little better. There were
no standby forces readily available to throw into the Rwandan breach. Months after the authorization of a force
of 5,500, only a tenth of this force was actually identified for duty from reluctantly contributing African states.
A standing military staff would not have necessarily overcome these shortcomings. If such a staff had been in
existence and if its professional services had been readily available, the Security Council would have been
informed about these shortfalls in planning and operations. The professional advice of the military staff would
have added to other pressures within and outside the United Nations for the Security Council to have acted with
all deliberate speed to address this catastrophe.
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Caution should be observed here, too, in assessing the positive impact that a standing military staff might
have on stopping genocide or grave abuses to human rights. As the belated French intervention in Operation
Turquoise suggests, the strategic and tactical success of timely intervention within a civil war setting is tricky.
The hasty or ill-considered introduction of UN forces might actually increase the killing if internal forces are
impeded from defeating perpetrators of genocide and from preventing crimes against humanity. The Tutsi
leaders of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) were wary of French intervention in light of Paris’ previous
support of the Habyarimana government. French military teams trained and equipped Rwandan military forces
and militia units. UN forces under Security Council control, on the other hand, would presumably enjoy greater
credibility for even-handedness than national forces. This asset would not automatically solve the more
daunting problem of accurately assessing the costs, benefits, and risks of intervention. A military staff
committee would assist in making these calculations more precise, rigorous, and transparent, but it could not
guarantee the success of a mission.
In this context, just war doctrine would appear to have considerable relevance. A standing military
committee would be charged to apply these principles in its plans and operations. The principles of just war,
updated to meet the circumstances of today, are still useful to encourage, if not fully ensure, careful and
calibrated use of violence for humanitarian purposes.
There is little need here to rehearse at length these just war principles. Honed over centuries of debate and
sometime practice, they are well enough known.100 The principles of just war, if incorporated into UN military
operations, would help determine whether more good than harm would come from using force. The principles
of jus ad bellum (resort to just war) requires (1) rigorous compliance to the strictures of legitimate authority
(which great power consensus within the United Nations would automatically supply); (2) just cause (ending
genocide); (3) right intention (intervention for no other ulterior aims than the end of the proscribed practice); (4)
violence as a last resort to be used only when all other means have been exhausted; (5) proportionality in using
force to ensure that the harm caused by intervening is less than that produced by the evil to be addressed; and
(6) an open declaration of public intent on war aims. These traditional principles are to be supplemented by jus
in bello. These rules discriminate between combatants and the civil population and limit the destruction of life
and property in battle beyond justified and legitimate military and political objectives, specifically sanctioned
by the legal and moral claims of ending genocide. Absent an institutional mechanism, like a military staff
committee, the United Nations will continue to react without adequate pre-planning and without the kind of in-
depth analysis of costs and risks needed to carry out is security functions.
Standby Accords
Since a standing UN military force is ruled out in the foreseeable future, standby accords with states prepared to
furnish forces and support equipment appear to be the most realistic option to pursue in the immediate future.
To minimize big power conflicts of interests, small powers might be approached to have troops on tap to
conduct UN anti-genocide operations. Canada, Australia, Philippines, Malaysia, Ghana, Morocco, and Ireland
are candidates. All have had considerable experience in UN peacekeeping. They possess varied military
capabilities and dispose a range of contrasting political assets capable of being tailored to the needs of different
peacekeeping missions. Standby accords are likely to be effective, moreover, if they are reached with states at a
level of socioeconomic development and military modernization to ensure capabilities sufficient to pose a
credible deterrent and serious threat to would-be genocide perpetrators. Standby accords with small states
would not furnish sufficient forces and backup support to cope with the genocide of the dimensions experienced
in the Balkans or in Cambodia. They would be sufficient, if Dallaire’s assessment is valid, to have made a
difference in Rwanda and to be relevant to many other conceivable scenarios in the developing world. They
would have the added advantage of being small enough to preclude challenging the big powers or their interests.
These forces would be incorporated into the planning of the military committee, covering command,
control, communications, and intelligence systems for efficient deployment and use in the field. Support,
transport, medical, and engineering backup would very likely have to be furnished by the major powers or by
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other states. UN elements could be seconded to regional forces already in the field or sent independently to
prevent large-scale murder of the innocent, depending on the scale of the genocidal threat. The expectation of
military planners under Security Council direction and of these forces, too, would be that they are fighting units,
dedicated to the critical but circumscribed mission of anti-genocide. They would not be neutral to this
practice.101 They would prepared, as arms control forces, to monitor and enforce minimal rules of war in civil
conflicts and to protect civil populations from wanton attacks. They should be able to create safe havens within
the territory of the afflicted state. The UN mission in Rwanda was specifically forbidden to enlarge its
responsibilities to provide such guarantees; some UN troops specifically detailed to protect the Tutsi population
and moderate Hutu and Tutsi elements in the government actually abandoned them to his slayers. When they
were needed most, both UN contingents were withdrawn from Rwanda. An otherwise preventable genocide just
ran its deadly course.
Liaison with Regional Security Organizations
As the Rwandan (and Kosovo) crises reveal, a serious breakdown in UN-regional security cooperation has been
allowed to develop. While the UN Charter was carefully crafted to pivot on big power cooperation as the basis
for peace, it also made generous provision for regional initiatives to address threats to peace that might
otherwise be ignored or ineffectually dealt with by the United Nations. In Rwanda the initially helpful work of
the Organization of African States (OAS) and the efforts of Tanzania in facilitating the Arusha accords were
never effectively backstopped by the United Nations. Extremist Hutu leaders were not co-opted into joining the
provisional peace agreement. They opted instead for a bloodbath over the ballot box. A UN–OAU sponsored
accord, fully supported by the resources of both organizations, might have succeeded in appealing to all warring
elements or, alternately, in preventing disgruntled parties from launching a program of genocide against their
opponents.
It is useful to recall, pending the establishment of an effective UN peacekeeping/peacemaking force, that
national and regional security forces have been the principal means to stop genocide and mass murder. The
Ugandan government’s travesties under Idi Amin were finally ended when Tanzanian forces overturned his
government. The wholesale slaughter of East Pakistanis by Muslim co-religious West Pakistani military forces
was stopped only by India’s intercession. Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia also ended Pol Pot’s killing
fields. Similarly, the Dayton accords arresting the Bosnia conflict and ethnic cleansing were achieved by NATO
forces under UN auspices. Until the massive entry of NATO ground troops to keep the peace, UN peacekeeping
forces were unable to stop mass killings, nor were they able to ensure safe havens in Bosnia anymore than in
Rwanda before.
Greater UN-regional security alliance cooperation again is no panacea. The principal shortcoming of
relying on national forces to stop genocide is that they are not primarily dedicated to international security aims.
A great deal of work and confidence building will have to be undertaken to make these cooperative mechanisms
work. On the one hand, most regional organizations are weak reeds to lean upon. Many regional organizations,
like the OAU, the Organization of American States (OAS), The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are scarcely prepared to undertake
extensive peacekeeping responsibilities. On the other hand, some, like NATO or a future militarily competent
European Union, may be all too prepared to conduct such operations. NATO and, specifically, American
strategy in intervening in Kosovo has come under sharp attack. Some observers condemn the bombing
campaign to force the Milosevic regime to permit the return of Albanian refugees to Kosovo as itself a crime
against humanity.102 Others, like many in Russia across the political spectrum, view the intervention as but
another installment of a long-range plan to impose an American hegemony over all of Europe. The bombing by
NATO of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade only added to Russian and Chinese fears that the United States
through NATO was reinforcing and extending its claim to strategic global dominion.
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Refugees
Finally, refugees, whether scattered in their homelands or to foreign states, are the inevitable offspring of
genocide. The fear for personal security drives people from their homes in a frantic search for self-preservation
when they are without the means to resist their assailants. Neither the heroic efforts of nongovernmental aid
groups, nor the hastily assembled contributions of states, nor the supportive activities of the UN High
Commission for Refugees were prepared for the flood of Rwandan refugees. These agencies were overwhelmed
by the immediate and enormous needs for health and sanitation, food, and shelter, occasioned by the abrupt
eruption of the genocide and its rapid spread. An added problem in Rwanda was the flight of those responsible
for the genocide and their subsequent takeover of refugee camps. Neither the NGOs nor the United Nations was
equipped to provide security for the victims of the genocide or those subsequently caught in the civil war
crossfire in these camps. As in Somalia, the distribution of humanitarian assistance hinged on the provision of a
system of security. In Rwanda, an understrength UNAMIR and a disoriented High Commissioner for Refugees
were ill-prepared to furnish these security guarantees.
The thirty years war in Rwanda highlights the problem of refugees as the incubator of genocide and
episodes of genocide. These exposed populations pose a threat to international security and human rights.
Unless their concerns are addressed by the international community, refugees are compelled to pursue self-help
efforts to solve their problems. The “refugee warriors” of Burundi and Rwanda continued their struggles from
neighboring states.103 RPA forces were trained and equipped for combat as a consequence of their participation
in the Ugandan civil war. The RPA staged its successful overthrow of Hutu power from Uganda. Now Hutu
refugees, many of whom are the perpetrators of 1994 genocide, are fighting in exile against the Tutsi-led Kigali
government. Refugees also sustain forces now fighting throughout the Great Lakes region in what are costly but
largely ignored interstate cum civil wars.
Conclusion
The road to the elimination of genocide, like that taken before by the great powers to rid the world of slavery,
will be long and hard. Given the powerful incentives, interests, and material resources supporting this practice,
it is by no means certain that this road will be successfully traversed. Ending genocide will clearly not end war
or armed conflict. Coercion will continue to decide disputes between peoples and states if for no other reason
than that the provisional solution to governance of the world society is the nation-state system. It remains a
warfare system. This proposal to end genocide or at least to take steps towards its eventual eradication is not
aimed at addressing these larger and more intractable shortcomings of governance.
The analogy with slavery aptly describes the limited intent of these proposals to enlist the great powers to
end genocide and genocidal practices. For millennia slavery was widely accepted as a legitimate and effective
economic practice. Its elimination did not end economic inequality or oppression. Nor were efforts to end this
practice directed by these broader aims. Humans have largely excised this economic practice from the processes
and organizational structures through which they produce and distribute material wealth. This is not say that
slavery in different forms does not persist around the globe. Certainly it persisted well after it was banned by
international and domestic law around the globe. What is clear is that its universal condemnation and
delegitimization as a civil practice robbed it of the moral and eventually the material support needed to sustain
it. Slavery, like genocide, joins the issue of order and legitimacy. As Adam Hochschild observes in his study of
Belgium King Leopold’s slave policies: “At the time of the Congo controversy a hundred years ago, the idea of
full human rights, political, social and economic, was a profound threat to the established order of most
countries on earth. It still is today.” 104
The long struggle against slavery suggests that no political order is sustainable unless it meets a test of
legitimacy. By any reckoning genocide cannot be reconciled with an international order capable of perfecting
and replicating itself. As political will is joined progressively to a broadened and deepened moral commitment
to an anti-genocide regime, the foundation is laid for the eventual elimination of this practice. The elimination
of genocide would not be an inconsequential accomplishment for the human species, any less so than the end of
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slavery. Raphael Lemkin, who is credited for having first coined genocide as a term, well understood that, while
genocide was a new word, it described practices traceable to the emergence of sentient, intelligent human
beings. What makes genocide objectionable is its finality. “Genocide,” as Lemkin averred, “was more
dangerous than war because the loss in genocide was irreparable.”105 It is a threat to the species itself and to its
collective capacity to perpetuate itself through its differentiated identities and competing moral persuasions in
pursuit of order and legitimacy. Implementation of the proposals advanced above to strengthen big power
cooperation through the United Nations will not eliminate genocide. Their institutionalization would, however,
make its outbreak more difficulty—deterring some would-be perpetrators; its damaging effects less severe; and
recovery from these genocidal attacks more rapid. Meanwhile, important milestones in big power cooperation
will have been passed, opening the way toward further progress on the road to the final eradication of genocide
as a civil practice.
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